1: Lee H-5 (no date) 1949 EE1 Bulgaria EE1
Yugoslavia

becoming premier in October, 1919, Stambolisky's first task was that of signing the peace terms drawn up by the victorious Allies.

The Treaty of Neuilly, November 27, 1919, reduced Bulgaria to a smaller area than it had held before the First Balkan War of 1912 and imposed new burdens. Bulgaria lost the Aegean coast (Western Thrace) to Greece, southern Dobruja to Romania, and strips of land on the west to Yugoslavia. The army was limited to a total of 20,000. Reparations amounting to $450,000,000 were to be paid in thirty-seven years, beginning in 1921. The existence of Bulgarian minorities in all the neighboring states furnished a basis for revisionism which steadily grew, particularly after the rise of fascism throughout Europe in the thirties.[2] The provision for an exchange of populations with Greece greatly heightened the volume of refugees who streamed into Bulgaria, adding to the political ferment and economic burdens of the country. In these and other ways, the settlement exacerbated conditions under which radicalism throve.

Stambolisky won a commanding position in the parliamentary elections of March, 1920, and proceeded to ride roughshod over both the middle class and conservative parties on the right and the Communists on the left. He instituted a number of reforms, including a land law designed to break up the crown lands and larger estates, the imposition of a heavy income tax, and the establishment of a compulsory labor service which in the first four years of operation secured the equivalent of five million wage days of work for the Ministries of Public Works and Railways. In foreign policy he sought to fulfill the treaties and to effect a reconciliation with Yugoslavia among whose Communist and Agrarian parties his concepts of Slavic federation found support. His dictatorial methods, however, won him enemies on all sides, not least among them being the Macedonians who opposed his policy of rapprochement with Yugoslavia. In June, 1923, he was overthrown by a *coup d'état* organized by a group of intellectuals, led by Professor Tsankov, and the League of Army Reserve Officers, among whom Colonels Velchev and Georgiev were leaders. A few days later Stambolisky was assassinated.

Following the Stambolisky regime, the Tsankov government (1923-26) represented a swing to the right. "Communist" insurrections and violence were suppressed with great severity. The increased activity of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) caused difficulties at home and abroad, although after the assassination of its leader Alexandrov (1924) it was split into two factions under Protoguerov and Mihailov who became bitter rivals. A threat of war with Greece arose, but was averted by the action of the League of Nations. A more conciliatory government

[2] See G. P. Genov, *Bulgaria and the Treaty of Neuilly* (Sofia, 1935).

11: Logio S-4 (no date) 1936 EE1 Bulgaria EE1

665 which no one could further trust. One of the leading
661 Sofia newspapers, the *Mir*, wrote on May 12, 1934 :

> „In Bulgaria there is no longer any State authority. At the head of the State are puny uncultured people who destroy and are incapable of constructing. And all these petty personalities are asking for more offices, more ministerial porfolios, more public funds for their political friends. Our Government is not a democracy, but purely and simply an organisation of marauding bands. The patient and submissive citizen asks how long will this state of affairs last?

668 Against this canker of demoralisation the reserve
701 officers, the only organised and patriotic force in the country, had several times protested and drawn the attention of the Government. They dispatched a deputation on January 18, 1933 to the Prime Minister recommending the adoption of certain measures which would curtail existing abuses. At the end of April 1933, they held a congress and they passed a resolution appealing to all men of goodwill to group themselves together and form a non-party government which might extricate the country from the bog in which it was wallowing. In another congress held at the end of 1933, they again insisted on the formation of a non-party Cabinet in order that the people might be saved from the prevailing demoralisalion which had set in among the political parties. These reminders however, had been disregarded.

When in May 1934, the Radical member of the Cabinet was so rudely unhorsed by his colleagues, it became apparent that the Mushanov Cabinet was at the end of its tether. There were only two political forces powerful enough to replace it The Agrarians, and Tsankov's Democratic Entente. They were utterly hostile to one another and each intent on excluding its rival from all participation in office. The advent of either to power meant the outbreak of a civil war, more bitter than that which had been waged in 1925. To prevent this calamity, the

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military decided much against their will to assume control of State affairs. This was done by the coup d'état of May 19, 1934, which met with the apparent approval of the bulk of the population, heartily sick of the disgusting squabbles of the political parties.

The military had warned in time the politicians that they should sink their quarrels and attend to the proper governing of the country; they had insisted on the necessity of the civilians combining to form a decent government, and seeing that their objurgations remained unheeded they had taken at last the task in their own hands. Even when they assumed power and in contrast with the politicians, they manifested no anxiety to fill the public offices with their adherents; they still appealed to certain civilians who enjoyed the reputation of being honest and capable men and entrusted them with responsible positions in the Government. The new Cabinet presided over by Kimon Gheorghiev had a distinctly civilian appearance, the military contented themselves with back seats, but they kept vigilant and alert and for once the rusty State machine began to function at a pace it had not experienced for years. In a manifesto to the people, drawn up in concise and blunt terms, the Government made known the reasons for which the army had decided to act, and exposed the programme it was intent on applying. The Government had learnt from the experiment of Tsankov that it was futile to seek the fusion of political parties in order to work with their support and by prescribed parliamentary methods; it therefore proceeded to dissolve both the Chamber and the political parties, declaring that the latter had outlived their usefulness. It made it known that it contemplated working out a scheme for the creation of a corporative Parliament in which all professions would be represented as well as certain political currents, but this was a matter for the future and in the meanwhile

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the Cabinet would govern by decrees. The Gheorghiev Cabinet fully justified the hopes placed in it. Never since its liberation did Bulgaria have such and efficient government; the reforms, improvements and innovations accomplished were most commendable and efficacious, and for this reason when its resignation was announced on January 22, 1935 the news caused deep disillusion and painful surprise to all those who had Bulgaria's well-being at heart.

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General Zlatev, the new Premier, was Minister of War in the Gheorghiev Cabinet; in a public speech delivered on February 24, 1935, while affirming that the programme of the Government remained identical with that proclaimed in the manifesto of May 19, he explained some of the reasons which had brought about his predecessor's resignation. According to him, his predecessors had somewhat swerved from the wishes of the army which had set them in power. Instead of prosecuting and suppressing indiscriminately all Macedonian organisations they had dissolved only the Michailovist wing (alleged to be subsidised by Italy) while the Protogerovist section (pro-Yugoslav) was allowed full liberty of action M. Kimon Gheorghiev was alleged to have sought inordinate powers for himself, wishing to wield an authority like that of Signor Mussolini! For this purpose he had demanded that certain prerogatives of the Crown should be curtailed These views had hurt the loyalist feelings of the army which was profoundly attached to Tsar Boris, and it had therefore decided on the Cabinet's reconstruction as a measure likely to cement the unity of the army which was threatened by the enunciation of such views. Those who know M. Kimon Gheorghiev and his colleagues, all of whom are distinguished by their extreme modesty have some difficulty in believing that either he, or any of his collaborators aspired or contemplated to don the mantle of a dictator. What they de-

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sired was to restrain such powers as the Crown possessed which had rendered its intervention often disastrous in the past, as had been the case for example on June 29, 1913[1]. It is with misgivings therefore that friends of Bulgaria have seen her drop these trusty pilots who have been quite gratuitously charged with fostering disunity in the army[2].

[1] The desire to abrogate such prerogatives of the Crown as that of disposing of all promotions and appointments in the army, and of nominating the war Minister, was a thoroughly democratic conception, for Tsar Ferdinand had largely abused of these privileges and had rendered the exercise of democracy illusory.

The breed of reptilian personalities which unfortunately abounds in Bulgaria and to which the consolidation af a regime, like that of K. Gheorghiev, spells disaster, has done its utmost to poison the mind of Tsar Boris against the promoters of such a liberal scheme, and especially against Colonel Damian Veltchev, to whose courage and abnegation he largely owes his maintenance on the throne, for it must not de forgotten that Colonel D. Veltchev is one of the chief organisers of the coup d'état of June 9, 1923 which averted the proclamation of a republic by Stambulliski.

That the retention of such rights by the Crown is a dangerous weapon becomes obvious from the fact that in October 1935 some 80 capable officers were forcibly retired, for no other reason save that of being suspected of sympathising with Colonel D. Veltchev and his colleagues.

The breaking of the careers of so many promising young officers is not likely to promote the unity which Bulgarians are vainly striving to attain; on the contrary, such arbitrary measures are likely to gravely compromise the popularity which the Crown has hitherto enjoyed and nullify one of the few centripetal forces which so far have helped to bind the nation together.

[2] To all appearances the brief spell of decent government ushered in by M. K. Gheorghiev and his colleagues will remain a unique episode in Bulgarian history and future Bulgarian poets will probably celebrate its memory after the style of Byron's effusions on Miltiades:

> The tyrant of the Chersonese
> Was freedom's best and bravest friend
> That tyrant was Miltiades!
> Oh! that the present hour would lend
> Another despot of the kind!
> Such chains as his were sure to bind".

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-Unity and concord unhappily are not the distinguishing virtues of the Bulgarians, and they are not likely to be fostered by the elimination of such devoted and courageous men as M. Kimon Gheorghiev's colleagues from office. It was rumoured that Colonel Veltchev, the able supporter and adviser of the former Cabinet, aimed at dispensing with the monarchy, (this was a deliberate lie, for the new Constitution which was being prepared provided for its maintenance) that the older officers resented this and that with their aid Tsar Boris had been able to turn the tables, taking advantage of the unfavourable report of the Financial Committee of the League of Nations on the financial reforms of the Government. Whatever the intimate wishes of Colonel Damian Veltchev, former director of the military academy, and one of the most intelligent, chivalrous, and progressive officers in the Bulgarian army, it is certainly not he who can be accused of sowing disharmony in the ranks of the army. Some six years ago when he was forced to resign from his post, he published an open letter in which he made it clear that certain army circles were intent on doing away with him. This letter created a sensation. The Sofia Press at the time (October 1929) declared that:

„The facts exposed profoundly revolted the public. No one could have suspected that behind the curtains such disgusting and black intrigues could be carried on in Bulgaria, and that even if only a fourth of what had beer divulged were true, the letter constituted a crushing condemnation for a community which could not guarantee security to its distinguished members".

When this document is recollected it would appear that the older officers reared in the school of Tsar Ferdinand and most of whom had not been asked to participate in the „coup d'état" of May 19, because of their participation in that of Prof. A. Tsankov had proved the undoing of his movement, resented the independence shown by their younger colleagues, and had engineered

11: Logic S-4 (no date) 1936 EE1 Bulgaria EE1

a cabal by which they succeeded in removing them from power. The principle of hierarchy and military discipline which had apparently been infringed on May 19, 1934 especially since this „coup" was carried out without considering the wishes of Tsar Boris, the supreme head of the army, was thus vindicated and restored. But whether unity will be promoted by such methods in the army remains to be seen. For there is another point of cleavage; Colonel Veltchev favoured a policy of reconciliation with Yugoslavia and was supported by the junior officers, as well as by the organisation of the non-commissioned officers of the reserve, while the older officers sided with General Vulkov, of rather sinister fame, former minister in the Tsankov Cabinet, and later minister in Rome, who is held to be a favourite of the Court and headed the pro-Italian wing of the army. The fact that he was dismissed from his post at Rome on the accession to power of the Gheorghiev Cabinet is indicative of the existing tension between the two groups into which the military are divided. Unity and harmony seem to be foreign to the mentality of the Bulgarians; there must always be some disunity and scission; as of old, the political parties were split into Russophiles and Austrophiles, so now there are slowly evolving pro-Italian and pro-Yugoslav currents into the vortex of which both the army and the Macedonian organisation are being steadily drawn.[1] These senior officers are, as may be expected, rather of too conservative tendencies, and one may, question the advisability for a little country like Bulgaria embaking on an intensely nationalistic educational programme as had been decided upon at this belated hour. The utility of such methods is disputable even for large States like Germany; but for small

[1] It is fortunate indeed for Bulgaria that at the time of writing Italy and Yugoslavia seem to be composing their senseless quarrel so that they will cease fomenting disunity in Bulgaria.

8: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1951 EF1 Yugoslavia
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increased U.S. aid to Monarcho-Fascism; and so forth." The Party line, the radio added, was formally changed. Henceforth the emphasis would be on "the organization and leadership of the political and economic struggles of all the strata of the working people—above all, the working class and employees, the displaced peasants, the hundreds of thousands of wounded, the war victims, the women and the youth." G 665 648

The admission that Greek nationalism had won a military victory and that Greek Communism must try to regain its hold on the masses by returning to the first principles of social action did not mean, of course, that propaganda warfare or even terroristic acts had to cease. Soon Nicolas Zachariades was writing in the Cominform journal that the American aim of creating a "Belgrade-Athens axis" must be fought "concretely, daily, constantly and tirelessly." As an example of what he meant he suggested sabotage of Jugoslav railway lines. But nothing could hide the fact that once again the feud with Belgrade had damaged Soviet Russia. It had drawn attention to the difference between her interests and those of her satellites. It had split the Greek Communist forces. It had helped the Truman Doctrine achieve its purpose sooner than might otherwise have happened.

In the autumn of 1950 as so often in the past Russia faced the old dilemma that if she favored one Balkan nation too openly she would outrage the others. The Soviet leaders now were aware, too, that when they spoke of a nation they could not exclude the Communists in it: Tito had added a complication to the Soviet game instead of simplifying it. The temptation to set the Bulgars loose against Tito must nevertheless have been very strong. The Bulgarian Army was newly equipped with Russian arms and had been reorganized by the new Minister of Defense, Lieutenant-General Peter Panchevsky, a former Soviet Army officer. Another former Soviet officer, General Novikov, was in command at the key center of Plovdiv. The size of the Bulgarian Army was not known precisely—certainly it was in excess of the 55,000 permitted by the peace treaty—but in any case, though growing, it was still smaller than the Jugoslav Army and inferior to it also in training and morale. Nevertheless Korea B 701 000